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How Dykes on Bikes Got It Right:
Procedural Inequities Inherent in the
Trademark Office’s Review of
Disparaging Trademarks
By JESSICA M. KISER*
If I must be labeled other than as a “person,” “human being,” or
“woman,” I choose “Dyke.” “Dyke” is a strong word and I say it with
pride. “Dyke” expresses my pride in myself, my existence, and in
what I have accomplished. I am gay. I am a lesbian. I AM A DYKE!
—Soni Wolf, Secretary of the San
Francisco Women’s Motorcycle
Contingent1
Introduction
THE SAN FRANCISCO WOMEN’S MOTORCYCLE CONTINGENT
(“SFWMC”) was formed in 1976 and organizes, as one of its largest
and most high profile events, the Dykes on Bikes contingent as part of
the annual San Francisco Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Pride
Parade.2 While this Dykes on Bikes tradition has taken place since
1976,3 the SFWMC did not seek to register the DYKES ON BIKES
trademark until 2003. The organization was spurred to seek registra-
tion after a third party, unaffiliated with the organization, attempted
* J.D., Columbia Law School. B.S. and B.A., Boston University. The author is
currently a Westerfield Fellow at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. The
author would like to thank Kristin Barone, for all of her tireless research and editorial
assistance, and Sean Wright, for his unwavering support.
1. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence In-
coming, Aug. 23, 2004 (Declaration of Soni S.H.S. Wolf).
2. History, DYKES ON BIKES, http://www.dykesonbikes.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=63 (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
3. Id.
1
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to register the trademark for a profit-making enterprise.4 To protect
the history associated with their unofficial name, the organization sub-
mitted a trademark application for DYKES ON BIKES to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on July 31, 2003.5 It
took seven months before the USPTO responded and denied the
trademark application declaring that the word “dyke” is disparaging to
lesbians in violation of the Lanham Act’s prohibition on the federal
registration of disparaging trademarks.6
In short, the USPTO told this group of lesbians that the name
they called themselves for almost twenty-five years was too offensive to
lesbians—such as themselves—to receive federal trademark protec-
tion. In response to this “slap in the face,”7 the SFWMC utilized the
help of a trademark attorney in order to prepare a lengthy response
submitted on August 23, 2004 explaining that the term dyke has been
reappropriated by the lesbian community and is now an expression of
pride rather than disparagement.8 This response included numerous
statements by linguists and sociologists about the positive use of dyke
in the lesbian community and by members of the SFWMC attesting to
their own positive understanding and use of the term.9 These declara-
tions included the statements at the start of this Article by the
SFWMC’s Secretary, Soni Wolf.10 Again, on October 28, 2004, the
USPTO denied their application.11
The SFWMC took months to gather additional affidavits and aca-
demic support and then appealed this final rejection on April 28,
2005.12 In this appeal, the SFWMC provided additional evidence in
the form of declarations from academic and linguistic experts, evi-
dence of the positive use of dyke in publications and websites,13 a list
of other reappropriated slurs approved by the USPTO, and even a
videotape of a Dykes on Bikes pride rally, highlighting the positive
4. Id.
5. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746 (filed July 31, 2003).
6. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Office Action Outgoing, Feb.
20, 2004.
7. Barbara Raab, Rough Ride, NAT’L SEXUALITY RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2006), http://nsrc.
sfsu.edu/article/rough_ride.
8. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence In-
coming, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Office Action Outgoing, Oct.
28, 2004.
12. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence In-
coming, Apr. 26, 2005.
13. Id. at exhibits 1–24.
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response of those in attendance.14 The trademark application was fi-
nally approved on January 4, 2006, but official registration was delayed
further until October 30, 2007 because of a third party opposition.15
Thus, it took more than four years of waiting and fighting, as well as
countless attorney and expert hours, before the SFWMC finally re-
ceived federal trademark registration for DYKES ON BIKES—a trade-
mark that the organization had been using publicly across much of
the country since 1976.16
While this long, drawn-out process was likely frustrating and ex-
hausting to the SFWMC, especially in light of the fact that the trade-
mark involved was intimately tied to the SFWMC members’ own senses
of self, this Article argues that this tedious progression is an example
of how the trademark application process for potentially disparaging
trademarks should properly occur. The alternative, as discussed later
in this Article, leads to inconsistency and insurmountable hurdles im-
posed on unsuspecting and disparaged third parties.
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to the United States
trademark system, the benefits of federal trademark registration, the
process by which federal registration is obtained, and how the prohibi-
tion on the registration of disparaging marks affects that process. Part
II provides a comparison of the procedural and legal process under-
taken in connection with the attempt to obtain federal registration for
three well-known, contentious trademarks. Part III discusses the
problems inherent in the USPTO’s current handling of the disparage-
ment prohibition as illustrated by the aforementioned trademarks. Fi-
nally, Part IV suggests procedural changes that could be implemented
to ensure that the disparagement analysis undertaken by the USPTO
is more equitable, predictable, and less burdensome to third parties.
I. Trademark Background
Trademarks are all around us. While many are easily identifi-
able—STARBUCKS, FORD, and GOOGLE—it is easy to accept their
14. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Applicant’s Request to Re-
mand for Additional Evidence, Exhibit A, Sept. 15, 2005.
15. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Registration Certificate, Oct.
30, 2007. The delay between publication and final registration of this trademark is due to
the fact that an opposition proceeding was brought by a third party after the mark was
published in the Official Gazette, challenging the registration of DYKES ON BIKES on the
grounds that “dykes” is disparaging to men. This opposition was dismissed after the third
party opposer was determined to lack standing to sue. McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motor-
cycle Contingent, 240 F. App’x. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
16. See History, supra note 2.
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presence without questioning their purpose. Trademarks are source
identifiers used to “identify and distinguish” the goods or services of-
fered by a person or business.17 Trademarks are useful to an entity
selling a product in that a trademark: (1) identifies the seller’s prod-
uct and makes it distinct from those products sold by others; (2) signi-
fies that all of the products bearing the mark come from a single
source, the seller; (3) allows consumers to rely on the assumption that
all products bearing the trademark are of a consistent level of quality;
and (4) serves as a focal instrument for the advertising and marketing
of the seller’s products.18 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion, a treatise often relied upon by trademark practitioners and
courts, explains that at the heart of a trademark is a company’s “good
will”:
[A] trademark is also the objective symbol of the good will that a
business has built up. Without the identification function per-
formed by trademarks, buyers would have no way of returning to
buy products that they have used and liked. If this consumer satis-
faction and preference is labeled “good will,” then a trademark is
the symbol by which the world can identify that good will.19
Simply by using a trademark in commerce in connection with
goods or services, the owner of that mark possesses certain common
law rights to the mark without ever seeking any federal or state regis-
tration.20 However, federal registration of a trademark confers certain
exclusive benefits on the trademark owner, including constructive no-
tice nationwide of the trademark holder’s ownership and use of the
mark,21 the ability to bring suit for infringement of the mark in fed-
eral court regardless of the amount in controversy, and the ability to
stop importation of any goods improperly bearing the registered
mark.22 Additionally, once a trademark is registered with the USPTO,
17. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “trademark”); see also 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1 (4th ed.
2011).
18. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 3:2.
19. Id.
20. 2 id. § 16:1.
21. This creates the presumption that the trademark holder possesses exclusive use of
the mark nationwide even in parts of the country where the trademark holder is not cur-
rently using the mark and may never have plans to do so. Thus, a subsequent user of the
mark cannot claim ignorance of the mark or use “good faith” as a defense in a future
infringement suit. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 221 (3d ed. 2001).
22. Id. at 221–22.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN101.txt unknown Seq: 5 21-OCT-11 14:35
Summer 2011] HOW DYKES ON BIKES GOT IT RIGHT 5
future trademark applications that are likely to be confused with the
registered mark will be denied.23
A. The Federal Registration Process
To obtain federal registration of a trademark, the trademark
owner must submit an application for registration of the trademark to
the USPTO.24 This application must clearly illustrate the proposed
trademark and describe the goods or services with which it is currently
being used25 (or is proposed to be used).26 Once received by the
USPTO, the trademark application is assigned to a trademark exam-
iner who will first review the application to confirm that it complies
with certain procedural requirements.27 Then, the examiner will re-
view the trademark to ascertain whether it can be accepted for regis-
tration or if it must be rejected for one of various substantive
reasons.28
If accepted by the examiner, the trademark application will be
published in the Official Gazette.29 This publication provides notice
to third parties of the USPTO’s intent to allow federal registration for
such trademark and allows such third parties an opportunity to for-
mally oppose the registration.30 An unopposed trademark will then
23. Likelihood of confusion is a standard applied both by the USPTO in evaluating
trademark applications and by the courts in analyzing claims of trademark infringement.
Whether being evaluated by a court or the USPTO, “likelihood of confusion depends upon
whether the purchasing public would mistakenly assume that the applicant’s goods or ser-
vices originate with, are sponsored by, or are in some way associated with the goods sold
under a cited registration or trademark.” 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 23:78.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006).
25. Id.
26. Starting in 1988, a revision of the Lanham Act began permitting trademark appli-
cants to file an application to register a trademark based on a bona fide intent to use the
trademark in commerce. While federal registration will not be officially issued by the
USPTO for an intent-to-use trademark application until proof of use is later provided, the
ability to register early provides constructive notice of the applicant’s use of the mark to
deter potential users of confusingly similar marks. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
28. JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 1201–17 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter
TMEP].
29. Id. § 106. The Official Gazette is issued every Tuesday and is the official publica-
tion of the USPTO; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1062.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1062; see TMEP, supra note 28, § 106.
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receive its federal registration and will appear on the Principal Regis-
ter31 thirty days after its publication date.32
However, the trademark application may be rejected for a variety
of substantive reasons, including if, for example, it is determined to be
confusingly similar to a trademark that is currently registered.33 Addi-
tionally, under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, the trademark will be
refused if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandal-
ous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connec-
tion with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute . . . .”34 Once re-
fused, the trademark examiner issues a response (an “Office Action”)
that is mailed to the applicant detailing the reasons for refusal.35 The
trademark applicant then has six months to respond to the Office Ac-
tion with additional evidence, revisions to its initial application, or le-
gal arguments that may permit registration.36
If the trademark applicant responds to the Office Action, the
trademark examiner may either accept the applicant’s arguments, evi-
dence, or revisions, or the examiner may issue another Office Action
detailing the deficiencies that remain.37 A few more rounds of this
back and forth between the examining attorney and the applicant
may occur until the examining attorney approves the registration or
issues a final rejection of the application;38 however, often the appli-
cant simply abandons the contested application rather than reply to
the examining attorney. The trademark applicant may appeal a final
rejection to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”),39 and a
31. Marks that meet the Lanham Act’s requirements for registration are registered on
the Principal Register. Section 23 of the Lanham Act created a Supplemental Register on
which certain marks not capable of being registered on the Principal Register—such as
those that are descriptive or geographic in nature, or which are surnames—may still be
registered if such marks “are capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services.”
15 U.S.C. § 1091. Registration on the Supplemental Register does not afford the trademark
owner with all of the benefits associated with registration on the Principal Register, but it
does allow the owner to bring suit in federal court and provides some notice to third
parties of the owner’s use of the mark; see GINSBURG, LITMAN & KEVLIN, supra note 21, at
223.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
33. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 23:77–:78.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The Lanham Act is the name commonly used for the Trade-
mark Act of 1946, which was codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127.
35. TMEP, supra note 28, § 701.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1070.
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decision of the TTAB may then be appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.40 An approved trademark
registration may also be brought before the TTAB and appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals if a third party initiates an opposi-
tion proceeding against a trademark (after it has been published in
the Official Gazette, but before it has been published on the Principal
Register)41 or files an action to cancel the trademark (after it has been
published on the Principal Register).42
B. Section 2(a)’s Prohibition on Disparaging Trademarks
As mentioned above, section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars regis-
tration of a trademark if it “[c]onsists of or comprises . . . matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, liv-
ing or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols or bring them
into contempt, or disrepute.”43 The legislative history for section 2(a)
does not indicate the legislature’s goals for, or reasoning behind, ad-
ding this disparagement prohibition to federal trademark registra-
tion,44 but courts interpreting section 2(a) have stated a number of
possible justifications. In discussing the prohibition on scandalous
trademarks under section 2(a), the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals stated:
In providing that marks comprising scandalous matter not be regis-
tered, Congress expressed its will that such marks not be afforded
the statutory benefits of registration. We do not see this as an at-
tempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the Congress
that such marks not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of
the federal government.45
Additionally, the Third Circuit has stated that the interests protected
under such provisions of the Lanham Act are not just injuries to a
40. Id. § 1071.
41. Id. § 1063.
42. Id. § 1064.
43. Id. § 1052(a). Though outside the scope of this Article, numerous scholars have
argued that section 2(a) is unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment or Due
Process. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the
Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 187 (2005); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team
Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 65 (1997); Lilit Voskanyan,
Comment, The Trademark Principal Register as a Nonpublic Forum, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1295
(2008).
44. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1737 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
45. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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specific challenging individual, but rather to the “integrity of the
register.”46
An analysis of potentially disparaging trademarks is further com-
plicated by the fact that the legislature failed to include a definition of
what constitutes a “disparaging” mark under section 2(a). At first, the
USPTO and the TTAB solved this problem by either conflating the
treatment of disparaging marks with the jurisprudence on obscene or
scandalous marks,47 or by barring registration only when the dispar-
agement appeared “obvious” in the eyes of the examining attorney or
the TTAB. For example, a court in 1951 held that using the mark
DOUGH-BOY in connection with an anti-venereal disease medication
“obviously” disparaged American soldiers because “doughboy” was a
nickname given to such soldiers during World War I.48 In 1969, the
TTAB similarly decided, without providing any support for its deter-
mination or any additional analysis, that “[t]here can be no question”
that a mark with an “X” over a hammer and sickle disparaged the
Communist Party.49
In In re Hines, decided in 1994, the TTAB followed scandalous-
ness precedent and clarified that disparagement under section 2(a)
should be defined according to its plain meaning as set forth in dic-
tionary definitions.50 As such, a disparaging trademark was held to be
one that may disparage a person, institution, belief, or national sym-
bol when it can “depreciate,” “belittle,” or “bring reproach or dis-
credit upon” such person or entity.51 The TTAB in Hines then
clarified that, in analyzing whether a mark is disparaging, “the percep-
46. Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (where the plaintiff peti-
tioned to cancel the registration of a trademark that was allegedly obtained fraudulently in
violation of section 14 of the Lanham Act).
47. See, e.g., In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (holding that
the mark MADONNA was scandalous in connection with wine because of its reference to
the Virgin Mary in the Christian religion); Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 156, 156 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1938) (denying registration of QUEEN MARY for wo-
men’s underwear because of its scandalous association with the Queen of England).
48. Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227, 228 (Dec.
Exam’r Pat. 1951).
49. In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 304, 305
(T.T.A.B. 1969).
50. See In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1688 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (relying on the
use of dictionary definitions in defining “scandalous” in In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481,
485–86 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
51. Id. (holding that the mark BUDDA BEACHWEAR is disparaging because it trivial-
izes Buddhists) (reversed on other grounds by In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376
(T.T.A.B. 1994)). This reliance on dictionary definitions was followed by the TTAB in
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1738 (T.T.A.B. 1999), where the
TTAB looked to a dictionary published around the time of the enactment of section 2(a)
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tions of the general public are irrelevant.”52 Rather, the relevant per-
ceptions are of those persons or groups who are “referred to,
identified or implicated in some recognizable manner by the involved
mark . . . .”53
This focus on the perceptions of the disparaged group was later
incorporated into a two-part disparagement test by the TTAB in Harjo
v. Pro-Football, Inc. (“Harjo I”).54 First, the meaning of the matter in
question “as it appears in the marks and as those marks are used in
connection with the services identified in the registrations” must be
determined.55 This determination looks at dictionary definitions as
well as the elements that make up the mark in its entirety, the nature
of the product or service offered in connection with such mark, and
the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace.56
For the second part of this test, the TTAB (or court) must deter-
mine whether such meaning may disparage a substantial composite of
the referenced persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.57
The TTAB clarified that “in deciding whether the matter may be dis-
paraging, we look, not to American society as a whole . . . but to the
views of the referenced group.”58 Additionally, in an action to cancel
an existing trademark registration, the court clarified that the ques-
tion of whether the mark is disparaging to a substantial composite of
the referenced group looks back at the group’s perceptions of the
mark at the time the mark was registered and not the date of the
cancellation action.59
II. Inconsistencies and Inequities in Recent Decisions
Determining whether a trademark is disparaging is still a very sub-
jective matter despite the two-part test clarified in Harjo I. An examin-
ing attorney must first use dictionary definitions and personal
knowledge to determine how the general public would interpret a
to define disparagement as to “dishonor by comparison with what is inferior, slight, depre-
cate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust comparison.”
52. In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
53. Id.
54. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1740–48 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
55. Id. at 1740–41.
56. Id. at 1738–39.
57. Id. at 1740–41.
58. Id. at 1738–39. This is a significant distinction between the analysis of disparaging
marks and that of scandalous marks where a similar two-step test is used, but such a test
refers to the views of a substantial composite of the general public as the appropriate refer-
ence group for both steps.
59. See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1832 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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trademark. Then that attorney must adopt the mindset of a member
of the referenced group to determine whether a substantial composite
of the group would feel disparaged. Obviously, this is not an easy task
and leads to some imprecise and inconsistent results across different
examining attorneys. The trademark registration process as under-
taken in connection with three trademarks—DYKES ON BIKES,
WASHINGTON REDSKINS, and HEEB—is detailed below. The pro-
cess under which these marks obtained, or failed to obtain, federal
registration highlights some of the problems that result from the
USPTO’s current treatment of potentially disparaging trademarks.
A. DYKES ON BIKES
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, the San Francisco
Women’s Motorcycle Contingent submitted a trademark application
to the USPTO on July 31, 2003 for their popular nickname, DYKES
ON BIKES.60 On February 20, 2004, the trademark examiner who was
assigned to the application issued an Office Action refusing to register
the mark based on the fact that the term dyke as used in the proposed
mark “may disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute to the les-
bian, bisexual and transgender communities.”61 Thus, the examiner
claimed that the mark was barred from registration based on section
2(a) of the Lanham Act.62 This refusal to register the mark is some-
what unusual in the history of section 2(a) decisions, given that the
applicants are members of the group that is allegedly disparaged by
the mark: lesbians who have reappropriated the mark as a symbol of
pride and rebellion in connection with their motorcycle and en-
tertainment services marketed towards fellow women.63
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, in response to this
rejection and the subsequent final rejection on October 28, 2004, the
SFWMC provided hundreds of pages of supplemental evidence high-
lighting the positive, self-referential use of dyke within the lesbian
60. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, supra note 5.
61. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Office Action Outgoing, supra
note 6.
62. See id.
63. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, supra note 5. The applica-
tion was specifically submitted in International Class 41 for:
Education and Entertainment Services in the nature of organizing, conducting,
and promoting parade contingents, community festivals, events, street fairs, fo-
rums, seminars, parties and rallies to support, organize and motivate women mo-
torcyclists everywhere to do the same, thereby fostering pride in a wide variety of
sexual orientations and identities, namely lesbian, bisexual and transgender.
Id.
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community.64 Then, the SFWMC appealed this final rejection to the
TTAB on April 26, 2005 and provided even more evidence.65 In light
of this additional evidence provided on appeal, the TTAB remanded
the application back to the examiner for reconsideration on Novem-
ber 2, 2005.66 The examiner relented and the trademark application
was finally approved for publication on January 4, 2006 and registered
on October 30, 200767—more than four years after the initial applica-
tion was submitted.
It is interesting to note that other applications for “reap-
propriated” lesbian slurs were reconsidered by the USPTO after the
DYKES ON BIKES decision. Despite denying the initial applications
for such marks, DYKES IN THE CITY was registered in August 2006,
DYKE TV was registered in October 2006, and DYKEDOLLS was regis-
tered in June 2007.68 The attorneys representing the applicants for
DYKEDOLLS and DYKES IN THE CITY specifically referred to the
USPTO’s approval of the DYKES ON BIKES registration and the evi-
dence submitted in support of that application as evidence that the
lesbian community does not use the term dyke in a disparaging
manner.69
As previously mentioned, the SFWMC was clearly forced to wait a
long time and provide a significant amount of evidence before finally
obtaining their federal trademark registration. However, providing
such a large amount of evidence is not unreasonable in light of the
fact that the SFWMC wanted to register a mark that was clearly dispar-
aging in the past. Therefore, this evidence was necessary to prove to
the USPTO that a substantial composite of the lesbian community had
accepted the new meaning of dyke. In the end, the SFWMC was suc-
cessful and obtained a registration for this reappropriated mark.70
The SFWMC also paved the way for the registration of other dyke
64. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Reconsideration Letter, May
25, 2005.
65. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence In-
coming, supra note 12; U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Applicant’s Re-
quest to Remand for Additional Evidence, Exhibit A, supra note 14.
66. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Remanded to Examiner, Nov.
2, 2005.
67. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Registration Certificate,
supra note 15; McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240 F. App’x. 865 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
68. DYKES IN THE CITY, Registration No. 3,128,444; DYKE TV, Registration No.
3,164,331; DYKE DOLLS, Registration No. 3,254,737.
69. Id.
70. See DYKES ON BIKES, Registration No. 3,323,803, supra note 15.
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trademarks, which were able to register in a more efficient manner by
utilizing the substantial bank of evidence submitted by the SFWMC in
proving the new meaning of dyke.71
B. The WASHINGTON REDSKINS
The registration history of the various trademarks associated with
the Washington Redskins football team shows a much more muddled
and contentious fight over disparagement. In July of 1933, George
Preston Marshall changed the name of his professional football
franchise from the Boston Braves to the Boston Redskins.72 It would
later be alleged in proceedings in connection with a cancellation ac-
tion brought against the team’s trademarks by a group of Native
Americans that Mr. Marshall changed the name of the team to honor
the team’s head coach, William “Lone Star” Dietz, who was a Native
American.73 However, it is noteworthy that at the time the football
team was called the Boston Braves, the city of Boston was also home to
a National League baseball team, also known as the Boston Braves,
and that William Dietz’s poor performance led to him being fired
from the team after only a few years as head coach.74 In 1937, the
Boston Redskins franchise moved to the Washington D.C. area and
became known as the Washington Redskins.75 Despite the fact that
the trademark had been in use since the 1930s, federal registration
was not sought for THE REDSKINS mark (with a stylized design) until
July 14, 1966.76 This registration was followed by applications for
WASHINGTON REDSKINS (without a design),77 THE REDSKINS
(with a different design from the 1966 registration),78 and WASHING-
TON REDSKINS (with a design)79 on September 11, 1972. Additional
71. E.g., DYKES IN THE CITY, Registration No. 3,128,444; DYKE TV, Registration No.
3,164,331; DYKE DOLLS, Registration No. 3,254,737.
72. BRUCE STAPLETON, REDSKINS: RACIAL SLUR OR SYMBOL OF SUCCESS? 1 (2001).
73. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104 (D.D.C. 2003).
74. STAPLETON, supra note 72, at 1.
75. Id.
76. THE REDSKINS, Registration No. 836,122. The USPTO allows a trademark owner
to apply for the same mark in multiple applications for different goods and services. Addi-
tionally, different applications would be required if one application only covers specific
words alone and another covers the words along with a related design. For example, this
registration covers the words THE REDSKINS in a stylized design for “Entertainment ser-
vices—namely, football exhibitions rendered live in stadia and through the media of radio
and television broadcasts.” Id.
77. WASHINGTON REDSKINS, Registration No. 978,824 (words only).
78. THE REDSKINS, Registration No. 987,127 (words and design).
79. WASHINGTON REDSKINS Registration No. 986,668 (words and design).
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applications were filed for REDSKINS80 on November 26, 1976 and
REDSKINETTES81 on October 4, 1989. The earliest of these registra-
tions, for THE REDSKINS, was published for opposition on July 11,
1967 and approved on September 26, 1967.82 The final of these regis-
trations, for REDSKINETTES, was granted on July 17, 1990.83
On September 10, 1992, a group of seven Native Americans filed
a cancellation action against these six REDSKINS trademark registra-
tions, which were now owned by Pro Football, Inc.84 The petitioners
were each a member of a different federally recognized Native Ameri-
can tribe and alleged that the term “redskin” was disparaging to Na-
tive Americans.85 On April 2, 1999, the TTAB canceled these six
marks stating that the term “redskins” as used in Pro-Football, Inc.’s
marks references Native Americans.86 Furthermore, the TTAB noted
that the petitioners clearly established that, at the time of the registra-
tion of the marks, the use of “redskins” may be seen as disparaging by
a substantial composite of Native Americans.87
In light of the TTAB’s decisive holding that “redskins” may dis-
parage Native Americans, it is noteworthy that the TTAB never issued
an Office Action in response to any of Pro-Football, Inc.’s initial appli-
cations for such trademarks that questioned whether these marks
could be disparaging. Additionally, during the thirty-day window be-
tween the publication of each of the REDSKINS marks in the Official
Gazette and the official registration of the marks, no third party filed
an opposition against any of the marks. Despite the fact that Susan
Harjo, the lead petitioner, organized protests and wrote articles con-
demning the marks for years, it was not until she was contacted by a
trademark attorney who witnessed one such protest outside the 1992
Super Bowl in Minneapolis that she became aware of the possibility of
challenging the marks on the basis of section 2(a).88
Not surprisingly, given that the TTAB noted in its holding that
the parties to this trademark dispute “have been extremely conten-
80. REDSKINS, Registration No. 1,085,092 (words only).
81. REDSKINETTES, Registration No. 1,606,810 (words only).
82. See THE REDSKINS Registration No. 836,122, supra note 76.
83. See REDSKINETTES, Registration No. 1,606,810 (words only), supra note 81.
84. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707–09 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
85. Id.
86. The TTAB cited the Native American imagery present in the Washington Red-
skins logo as well as the use of such imagery in its marketing materials and team song as
clear evidence of the team’s intent to associate its mark with Native Americans. Id. at
1741–43.
87. Id. at 1743–44.
88. STAPLETON, supra note 72, at 4.
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tious,”89 the decision of the TTAB was appealed by Pro Football, Inc.
to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“Harjo
II”).90 On September 30, 2003, the district court overturned the
TTAB’s decision on two grounds: (1) the TTAB’s finding of disparage-
ment was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the consider-
ation of the case was precluded by the doctrine of laches, an equitable
defense that applies when a plaintiff’s delay in bringing a suit has un-
duly burdened the defendant.91
On the first ground for reversal, the court criticized the TTAB’s
findings with regard to dictionary definitions of the term “redskin.”92
The court noted that only half of the dictionaries surveyed contained
labels indicating that the term was offensive.93 Additionally, without
further evidence on the methodology and practices common in the
industry with regard to such labels, such disparity among dictionaries
could not support the TTAB’s finding that “redskin” was a patently
offensive term at the time of the registration of the REDSKINS
marks.94 The court also noted the insufficiency of the petitioners’ sur-
vey evidence.95 The survey conducted by the petitioners failed to focus
on the perceptions of the term “redskins” in the 1960s and 1970s,
when the first REDSKINS marks were registered, rather than the cur-
rent views of the public.96 Surveys concerning the current perceptions
of the term “redskin” generally—not in connection with the football
and entertainment services offered by Pro-Football, Inc.—were held
to be “entirely irrelevant” and failed to justify the cancellation of Pro-
Football, Inc.’s marks.97 Furthermore, the petitioners failed to provide
enough evidence to assure the court that the survey measured a repre-
sentative sample of Native Americans, and thus the court held that
such survey evidence could not support a finding that a substantial
composite of Native Americans find the marks disparaging.98
89. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709–10.
90. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
91. Id. at 145.
92. Id. at 129–30.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 132–33.
96. Id. at 132.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 132–33. Additionally, the court noted, based on facts supplied by Pro-Foot-
ball, Inc. during a July 23, 2003 motions hearing, that there are over 2.41 million Native
Americans in the United States and over 500 Native American tribes. As Native Americans
are such a dispersed and segmented ethnic group, the court neglected to clarify whether a
future cancelation action would need to include survey evidence from all 500 tribes in
order to overcome these objections.
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This trademark dispute still forged forward through the courts.
The Native Americans appealed the decision in favor of Pro-Football,
Inc. to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.99 On
July 15, 2005, that court upheld the district court’s determination that
laches barred six of the Native Americans from bringing the cancella-
tion action, but remanded the suit back to the district court to review
the defense of laches against the youngest petitioner.100 On June 25,
2008, the district court again held that the youngest petitioner’s can-
cellation action was barred by laches.101 This holding was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.102 The Su-
preme Court declined to hear the case on appeal on November 16,
2009.103 Thus, the REDSKINS trademark registrations owned by Pro-
Football, Inc. remain valid for the time being.104
While the process of registering DYKES ON BIKES may have
been frustrating for the SFWMC, the registration of the REDSKINS
marks created a much more burdensome fight for third parties who
have no tangible connection to the disputed trademarks or the busi-
ness they represent. In light of the refusal of the examining attorney
for DYKES ON BIKES to be swayed from viewing that mark as dispar-
aging, one might ask how the REDSKINS marks were permitted to
register without such a fight in the first place. As highlighted above,
there was a paucity of case law to help an examining attorney analyze
whether a mark was disparaging at the time of the registration of the
initial REDSKINS mark. Perhaps, the USPTO might have rejected this
mark, at least initially, if an application to register the trademark was
filed today; yet, it may be impossible for Native Americans to meet the
evidentiary requirements necessary to have the mark canceled now.
Thus, the USPTO may have permitted a disparaging mark to register
99. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
100. Id. The court held that the unreasonableness of a plaintiff’s delay must be judged
not from when any plaintiff could have brought a claim, which would have been in 1966
when the first trademark was registered, but from the time when each particular plaintiff
could have brought the claim. One of the Native American plaintiffs had only reached the
age of majority a few years prior to the commencement of this suit; as such, this youngest
petitioner’s claims were remanded so that the lower court could determine the unreasona-
bleness of this few year delay.
101. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2008).
102. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
103. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009).
104. Another group of Native American petitioners have filed a cancellation action
against these registrations. These petitioners were all near the age of majority at the time
the action was brought; as such, they believe laches will not bar their cancellation action
(which was on hold pending the resolution of the original REDSKINS suit). Blackhorse v.
Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 92046185 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2006).
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while also creating the evidentiary and laches-based burdens that will
keep this error from being fixed.
C. HEEB
The contradictory treatment of the trademark HEEB also illus-
trates the inconsistent treatment of potentially disparaging trade-
marks across various examining attorneys. Heeb Media LLC obtained
a federal trademark registration for HEEB for use in connection with
the “publication of magazines” on June 29, 2004.105 Heeb Media pub-
lished a magazine under the trademarked name that was marketed to
Jewish young people.106 The company claimed to have chosen the
name in order to transform the term “heeb” from its prior usage as a
derogatory term for Jewish individuals into a term of Jewish empower-
ment.107 As a natural expansion of the goods and services offered by
Heeb Media, the company submitted a second application to register
the mark HEEB on February 1, 2005 for use in connection with mar-
keting and promotional items, such as “clothing, namely, jackets, jer-
seys, sweat pants, sweat shirts, track suits, t-shirts, tank tops and pants;
headwear” and “entertainment, namely, conducting parties.”108
Despite the fact that Heeb Media already possessed one trade-
mark registration for HEEB, the examining attorney for this new ap-
plication denied its registration on the basis that the word “heeb” “is a
highly disparaging reference to Jewish people, that it retains this
meaning when used in connection with applicant’s goods and ser-
vices, and that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it
to be disparaging.”109 As evidence of the current disparaging meaning
of the term “heeb,” the examining attorney cited dictionary defini-
tions as well as printouts of excerpts from a Nexis database, which
contained reports by individuals and Jewish groups criticizing Heeb
Media’s use of the disparaging term for the name of its magazine.110
Heeb Media submitted numerous letters from prominent mem-
bers of the Jewish community and Jewish organizations supporting its
105. HEEB, Registration No. 2,858,011.
106. See About Heeb, HEEB MAGAZINE, http://www.heebmagazine.com/about (last vis-
ited Aug. 1, 2011). Heeb Media ceased production of print editions of the magazine in
August 2010 but continues to produce the magazine as an online publication. Joshua
Neuman, HEEB MAGAZINE, So Much for Controlling the Media, http://heebmagazine.com/so-
much-for-controlling-the-media/19154 (Aug. 26, 2010).
107. In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1073 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
108. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/558,043 (filed Feb. 1, 2005).
109. In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
110. Id. at 1072–73.
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reappropriation of the disparaging term.111 However, the TTAB
noted, “applicant’s own evidence shows that not all members of the
relevant public find the term HEEB to be unobjectionable;” the letters
submitted “suggest that there is a generational divide in the percep-
tion of this term.”112 The TTAB held that despite Heeb Media’s good
intentions the older generation of Jewish individuals who find the use
of “heeb” to be disparaging constitutes a substantial composite of the
referenced group.113 As such, the registration of this second HEEB
trademark was denied.114
Because of the USPTO’s inconsistent treatment of trademarks,
Heeb Media is in the awkward position of being able to enforce its
federal trademark rights against a potentially infringing magazine, but
may lack the rights to prevent trademark infringement in connection
with its marketing materials and giveaways, such as shirts or hats. How-
ever, the rights Heeb Media has in its one registered trademark could
be viewed as rights that it received too soon. In light of the TTAB’s
holding in connection with the second HEEB application, it is likely
that Heeb Media’s one registration was granted erroneously and
should have been denied until the applicant could provide more evi-
dence of the widespread adoption of the reappropriated meaning of
“heeb” by the Jewish community.
III. Problems Inherent in Section 2(a) Treatment
The discrepancy in the treatment of the DYKES ON BIKES trade-
mark as compared to the REDSKINS trademarks raises an obvious
question: Why were the REDSKINS trademarks not initially denied on
section 2(a) grounds as happened with the DYKES ON BIKES mark?
The simplest explanation is that determining disparagement is an in-
herently subjective matter, leading examining attorneys to make ap-
parently discrepant decisions for separate marks, such as in the case of
the HEEB marks, where one was approved and a second was denied.
However, the problem runs deeper: even if the examiner steadfastly
applies the TTAB’s two-step analysis specified in Hines and Harjo I, a
disparaging mark might still be allowed to register and may then be
nearly impossible to cancel. This undesirable outcome is the result of
two larger problems: (1) prohibitively difficult evidentiary burdens
111. Id. at 1073.
112. Id. at 1076.
113. Id. at 1077.
114. Id. at 1078.
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faced by disparaged groups in opposition and cancellation actions;
and (2) the improper application of the doctrine of laches.
In 1990, the TTAB recognized this inherent subjectivity and pro-
posed a procedural resolution for examining attorneys:
Because the guidelines are somewhat vague and because the deter-
mination is so highly subjective, we are inclined to resolve doubts
on the issue of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging in
favor of applicant and pass the mark for publication with the
knowledge that if a group does find the mark to be scandalous or
disparaging, an opposition proceeding can be brought and a more
complete record can be established.115
Thus, the USPTO has developed a policy of erring on the side of pub-
lication. For this reason, the TTAB overruled itself in the case of In re
Hines and allowed the registration of the mark BUDDA
BEACHWEAR.116 The TTAB’s decision on June 10, 1994 held that,
despite the TTAB’s lack of personal expertise concerning the Bud-
dhist religion, the mark BUDDA BEACHWEAR (which included an
image of Buddha wearing beach attire) undervalued and cheapened
the great religious significance of Buddha to Buddhists.117 As such,
the TTAB denied registration for this mark under section 2(a).118
However, the applicant filed a request for reconsideration, and, on
September 23, 1994, the TTAB approved the trademark applica-
tion.119 In doing so, the TTAB reiterated its lack of knowledge outside
of personal opinions and reference materials as to how the followers
of the Buddhist religion would view the mark.120 For this reason, the
TTAB allowed the mark to proceed to registration with the under-
standing that Buddhists could challenge the mark later if they so
desired.121
The USPTO appears to be indifferent about passing on this bur-
den to uninformed third parties and about the fact that disparaging
marks may be granted federal registration based on this policy. In In re
Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., the court nonchalantly admitted that
such errors may exist: “The fact that, whether because of administra-
115. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(holding that a mark containing the word “moonies” with the “o’s” replaced by an image of
a buttocks did not disparage Reverend Sun Myung Moon and his Unification Church as
the mark would likely be seen to refer not to Reverend Moon but rather to the act of
“mooning” viz., showing one’s buttocks).
116. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
117. In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1691 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
118. Id.
119. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77.
120. Id.
121. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN101.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-OCT-11 14:35
Summer 2011] HOW DYKES ON BIKES GOT IT RIGHT 19
tive error or otherwise, some marks have been registered even though
they may be in violation of the governing statutory standard does not
mean that the [USPTO] must forgo applying that standard in all
other cases.”122 This policy of allowing examining attorneys to err on
the side of registration simply passes the burden of deciding whether
a trademark is actually disparaging to third parties who may lack the
physical numbers and societal presence to actively monitor the trade-
mark register. Moreover, there may be cultural and socioeconomic
factors that result in third parties lacking the resources to meet the
higher evidentiary burdens inherent in an opposition or cancellation
action. Furthermore, third parties may not understand that they have
a right to challenge federally registered disparaging trademarks under
the Lanham Act in the first place. Additionally, this policy leads to the
erroneous registration of disparaging marks and begins the tolling of
time that will be used against any future disparaged petitioners when
the trademark holder claims laches in a future action. Thus, the
USPTO creates a huge evidentiary and practical hurdle and then
starts the race to see if a disparaged third party can surmount it in
time.
A. Evidentiary Burdens
The current treatment of disparaging trademarks places an un-
due burden on disparaged individuals due to the increased eviden-
tiary requirements necessary to prove disparagement after an
examining attorney either approves the mark for publication or offi-
cially grants the mark federal registration. This is due, in part, to the
fact that by allowing a trademark to be federally registered, the
USPTO allows the trademark holder to invest time and money into
building goodwill around that mark. The leading treatise on this sub-
ject observes that:
The registrant in a cancellation proceeding is entitled to the prima
facie presumption that the registration and the mark are valid, that
registrant is the owner and that registrant has the exclusive right to
use the mark. Thus, cancellation of a valuable registration around
which a valuable business good will has been built, should be
122. 334 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cited with approval in In re Heeb Media
LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1078 (T.T.A.B. 2008) where the TTAB was addressing the illogi-
cal circumstances of having one HEEB trademark registration approved and another de-
nied as patently disparaging).
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granted only with “due caution and after a most careful study of all
the facts.”123
Thus, a third party challenging a registered trademark under section
2(a) must provide a substantial amount of evidence to rebut this pre-
sumption of validity.
In an ex parte proceeding, where examining attorneys at the
USPTO simply review the trademark application, they are only re-
quired to provide a minimal degree of evidence that the mark is dis-
paraging.124 The TTAB has explained that “[i]n evaluating the
examining attorney’s evidence we must be cognizant of the USPTO’s
limitations in amassing evidence and ‘we look only for . . . more than a
scintilla of evidence, in support of the [USPTO]’s prima facie
case.’”125 The USPTO specifically directs examining attorneys to look
to “dictionary definitions, newspaper articles, and magazine
articles.”126
In response to a refusal by an examining attorney who alleges
that the mark is disparaging, applicants may persuade the examining
attorney to look past such evidence to see that the proposed use of the
trademark is not disparaging. In doing so, applicants may use alterna-
tive dictionaries or statements from linguistic experts,127 affidavits
from members of the disparaged group,128 survey results,129 and even
historical accounts.130 No specific degree or amount of such evidence
is required so long as the examining attorney is persuaded to publish
the mark for opposition.131 This process can be seen in the case of the
DYKES ON BIKES trademark. In that instance, the examining attor-
123. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 123 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 3 MC-
CARTHY, supra note 17, § 20:64) (quoting Rockwood Chocolate Co. v. Hoffman Candy Co.,
372 F.2d 552 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
124. See TMEP, supra note 28, § 1203.01 (where examining attorneys are advised that
they can feel sufficiently justified in their refusal to register a trademark on the grounds
that it is scandalous if they uncover dictionaries that identify the trademark as a scandalous
term).
125. In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (quoting
In re Pacer Technology, 338 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
126. TMEP, supra note 28, § 1203.01.
127. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 96; see also U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence Incoming, supra note 8.
128. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspon-
dence Incoming, supra note 8.
129. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspon-
dence, Dec. 6, 2005 (where the examining attorney for the DYKES ON BIKES application
states that she was persuaded to allow the trademark to proceed to publication after review-
ing new information provided by the applicant).
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ney may have been especially hard to persuade,132 but the applicant
was able to provide sufficient personal, expert, and supplemental evi-
dence to prove that the meaning of the term dyke had changed
amongst the lesbian community at large.133 In the case of the HEEB
trademark, the applicant (for the second trademark) was not able to
provide sufficient evidence that the term “heeb” had been reap-
propriated fully by the Jewish community.134 Perhaps, the applicant
could reapply in a few years and the reappropriated meaning would
be more widespread.
However, in an inter partes proceeding where a third party is op-
posing or petitioning to cancel an allegedly disparaging trademark,
the third party needs to provide “substantial evidence” that a substan-
tial composite of the relevant group finds the mark’s use disparag-
ing.135 In the case of the REDSKINS marks, the Native American
petitioners provided numerous expert statements as well as personal
statements and expensive and time-consuming survey results. Yet
none of this was substantial enough to justify cancellation of the RED-
SKINS marks in the eyes of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. As the Native American petitioners were sup-
ported by sophisticated pro bono counsel with substantial resources
available to assist them in obtaining this expert and survey evidence, it
begs the question of how a third party challenger without such re-
sources could ever be expected to meet this evidentiary burden. In
passing off the burden of deciding whether a mark is disparaging, the
USPTO may be allowing the registration of trademarks that, despite
being disparaging in violation of section 2(a), no third party will ever
be able to successfully cancel.136
B. Laches as a Burden on Third Parties
Adding to the burden imposed on third parties seeking to cancel
a trademark is the presumption of validity that courts afford to regis-
132. See Raab, supra note 7.
133. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/281,746, Paper Correspondence, supra
note 131.
134. In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
135. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
136. See, e.g., Joshua R. Ernst & Daniel C. Lumm, Does Budda Beachwear Actually Fit? An
Analysis of Federal Registration for Allegedly Disparaging Trademarks in the Non-Corporate Context,
10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 183–84, 200–01 (2010) (“Given the higher eviden-
tiary burden for cancelling a registered mark as opposed to refusing to register a mark, a
mark which was registered numerous years ago could survive a cancellation proceeding,
but if the same mark or a derivative of that mark were to be applied for today, it could
easily be refused registration.”).
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tered marks. After a trademark has been listed on the Principal Regis-
ter for five years, such registration constitutes prima facie evidence of
the validity of the trademark.137 After this time, the mark can only be
challenged for a limited set of specified circumstances. The Lanham
Act expressly includes section 2(a) challenges based on claims that the
mark “may disparage” a person or group as a grounds for cancelling a
trademark registration after this five-year deadline.138 However, the
District Court for the District of Columbia held in Harjo II that such a
cancellation action based on section 2(a) could still be barred by the
passage of time.139 In Pro-Football, Inc.’s appeal of the TTAB’s cancel-
lation of its REDSKINS marks, the district court held that the defense
of laches precludes the cancellation of such marks because the sub-
stantial delay by the petitioners in bringing their cancellation ac-
tion140 caused unfair economic prejudice to Pro-Football, Inc.141
1. Laches Background
While the defense of laches led to the dismissal of this modern
REDSKINS trademark dispute, the defense is certainly not a modern
development. Laches is an equitable defense that developed out of
the courts of equity in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth cen-
turies.142 Equity courts applied the defense of laches where a court of
law may have applied a statute of limitations to bar a plaintiff’s
claim.143 However, unlike a statute of limitations which sets a precise
time limit on when a cause of action may be brought before a court,
the applicability of laches is determined based on the balancing of
various equitable factors.144 In evaluating these equitable factors, the
court must assess whether the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit was ex-
cusable and whether it caused undue hardship on the defendant in
defending against such suit.145 The defense of laches is based on the
underlying principle that “equity aids the vigilant and not those who
137. See GINSBURG, LITMAN & KEVLIN, supra note 21, at 221.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006).
139. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
140. The district court focused on the fact that the petitioners brought the cancellation
action in 1992—twenty-five years after the team’s first “REDSKINS” registration was ob-
tained in 1967. Id. at 137.
141. Id. at 144.
142. See Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 357, 364–70 (arguing that the courts have misapplied the long-standing rules
regarding laches in the context of Native American land disputes).
143. Id. at 365–66.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 365.
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slumber on their rights.”146 The laches defense is thought to en-
courage plaintiffs to be vigilant about protecting their rights while
promoting judicial efficiency by requiring that suits be brought when
evidence is still available and when courts are in the best possible posi-
tion to resolve the underlying disputes.147
As U.S. courts possess both equitable and legal powers,148 laches
still exists as an affirmative defense in the modern legal system. In
Costello v. United States the Supreme Court held that “[l]aches requires
proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is
asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.”149 In
the context of trademark disputes, laches has most often been success-
fully asserted against a claim of trademark infringement where a plain-
tiff knowingly delayed in contesting the defendant’s infringing
trademark, thus unfairly permitting the defendant to invest significant
time and resources into its trademark.150 In such trademark disputes,
courts have required a defendant asserting laches to meet “three af-
firmative requirements: (1) a substantial delay by a plaintiff prior to
filing suit; (2) a plaintiff’s awareness that the disputed trademark was
being infringed; and (3) a reliance interest resulting from the defen-
dant’s continued development of good-will during this period of de-
lay.”151 The court in Harjo II applied this three-part test, reasoning
that this common law test could easily be modified to require Pro-
Football, Inc. to show that “(1) the Native Americans delayed substan-
tially before commencing their challenge to the ‘redskins’ trade-
marks; (2) the Native Americans were aware of the trademarks during
146. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
147. Id.
148. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2. This section of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismisses the
prior distinction between actions at law and suits in equity; instead, all such actions shall be
viewed as simply a civil action.
149. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961).
150. See, e.g., E-Systems, Inc. v. Monitek, Inc., 720 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1983) (em-
phasizing in this trademark infringement dispute “[b]ecause plaintiff and defendant adver-
tised in the same magazines and exhibited at the same trade fairs, plaintiff had ample
opportunity to discover defendant’s activities before defendant developed a substantial
business”); Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook Cnty. Creamery Ass’n, 465 F.3d
1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Even though Creamery and Smoker may not have operated in
the identical commercial channels at the time, the two companies were using similar marks
on complementary products in the same geographical area, creating the prospect of confu-
sion. Creamery had actual notice of Smoker’s allegedly infringing mark soon after
Smoker’s inception, thereby starting the laches period.”).
151. NAACP, 753 F.2d at 137.
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the period of delay;152 and (3) Pro-Football’s ongoing development of
goodwill during the period of delay engendered a reliance interest in
the preservation of the trademarks.”153 In modifying this test, the dis-
trict court reasoned that this three-part approach was consistent with
the traditional two-part test in that the first two elements, substantial
delay and notice, are necessary factors in evaluating whether there was
a lack of diligence or an unreasonable delay by the petitioning
party.154 Also, the court reasoned that the third element is tied to the
prejudice felt by the defendant.155 Using this interpretation of the re-
quirements for laches, the district court in Harjo II held that laches
barred the cancellation of the REDSKINS trademarks and that Pro-
Football, Inc. was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.156
Aside from factual arguments as to whether the laches test, as ap-
plied, was appropriate and whether Pro-Football, Inc. met its eviden-
tiary burden in proving the elements of laches, the application of
laches to cancellation actions is further evidence of the procedural
inequities inherent in the current handling of section 2(a) actions.
Typical cases involving a claim of laches involve two parties that were
both present for the dispute that gave rise to the cause of action.
Thus, both parties are aware of the time running against them in
terms of a statute of limitations or the defense of laches. Here, an
unaffiliated third party that brings a cancellation action is illogically
treated as if in the same position as the trademark applicant or the
USPTO. This is especially unreasonable as laches should not be appli-
cable to section 2(a) cancellation actions at all for two primary rea-
sons: (1) the plain language of the Lanham Act makes it clear that
152. Though outside the scope of this Article, an argument could be made that a bet-
ter modification of this “knowledge of infringement” requirement would be to ask whether
the Native Americans were aware of their ability to challenge the REDSKINS marks. The
requirement that the plaintiff be aware that the trademark was being infringed presumes
that the plaintiff understands the basic legal concept that trademarks can be infringed.
The court here neglected to recognize this difference between the general community
understanding of trademarks as property rights that can be violated and an understanding
of the intricacies of federal trademark prosecution that could allow a trademark to be
canceled for being disparaging. This is especially relevant as the REDSKINS marks were
used under common law from the 1930s without federal registration—and thus a third
party would have no means to cancel the disparaging common law mark—until the first
federal trademark registration was obtained in 1967.
153. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 136 (D.D.C. 2003) (agreeing with
the TTAB’s statement of the applicable law in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1140, 1144 (D.D.C. 2000)).
154. Id. at 139.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 139–40, 145.
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Congress intended to allow actions to cancel disparaging trademark
registrations to be brought at any time; and (2) applying laches to
prevent the cancellation of disparaging trademark registrations is con-
trary to the best interests of the public. Thus, allowing the application
of laches to section 2(a) actions creates yet another hurdle that could
prevent a third party from cancelling a disparaging trademark that
was improperly permitted to register in the first place.
2. Plain Meaning Prevents Application of Laches to Section 2(a)
Proceedings
The language of the Lanham Act itself, as well as the intent be-
hind enacting section 2(a), prevents the application of laches from
barring the cancellation of a mark that may be disparaging.157 Section
14 of the Lanham Act provides that a mark may be canceled “at any
time” if it were obtained contrary to section 2(a).158 Specifically, sec-
tion 14 states that a petition to cancel a trademark registration may be
filed:
(1) Within five years from the date of the registration of the mark
under this chapter.
(2) Within five years from the date of publication under section
1062(c) of this title of a mark registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905.
(3) At any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name
for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is regis-
tered, or is functional, or has been abandoned, or its registration
was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section
1054 of this title or of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 1052 of
this title for a registration under this chapter . . . .159
When viewed in light of the five-year limit on cancellation actions
generally, the plain meaning of the phrase “at any time” clearly indi-
cates that the situations contemplated by section 14(3), including can-
cellation actions brought against registrations issued contrary to
section 2(a), are not to be time-limited.160 Thus, such cancellation ac-
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006); see also Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192–93
(3d Cir. 2001).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
159. Id. § 1064(1)–(3).
160. It is a generally accepted principle that statutory interpretation should begin with
an analysis of the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”); United States v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (“But where the language of an enactment is clear,
and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable conse-
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tions are exempt from time-based defenses such as statutes of limita-
tions or laches. This view was supported by the Third Circuit in
Marshak v. Treadwell where the court concluded that “the meaning of
the phrase ‘at any time’ in Section 14(3) is clear even if that particular
subsection is viewed in isolation.”161 In Marshak the court held that a
defendant’s claim that a trademark registration was “obtained fraudu-
lently” could not be time-barred (whether by a statute of limitations or
collateral estoppel) due to the express language of section 14(3) that
such actions may be brought “at any time.”162
The district court in Harjo II rejected this assertion that the plain
meaning of “at any time” precludes the application of laches to ac-
tions brought under section 2(a).163 In coming to this decision, the
court pointed to 15 U.S.C. § 1069,164 which states: “In all inter partes
proceedings equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and acquies-
cence, where applicable, may be considered and applied.”165 The
court concluded that this provision of the Lanham Act specifically al-
lows for the application of laches in all instances and that interpreting
the “at any time” language of section 14(3) to bar laches would render
this express application of equitable principles meaningless.166 Unfor-
tunately the court failed to recognize the most logical interaction be-
tween these two provisions. The court should have recognized that 15
U.S.C. § 1069 permits the application of equitable principles like
laches only “where applicable.”167 Because section 14(3) allows spe-
cific types of cancellation actions to be brought at “any time,” such
cancellation actions would logically constitute instances where laches
would not be applicable. This does not render 15 U.S.C. § 1069 mean-
ingless since numerous other types of cancellation actions can be
brought under section 14, such as those brought on the grounds of
confusion, mistake, descriptiveness, functionality, or dilution.168
quences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning
intended.”).
161. Marshak, 240 F.3d at 192–93; see also Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 195 (1985) (stating that a registration “may be canceled at any time” if obtained
contrary to the provisions of section 2); Ohio State Univ. v. Ohio Univ., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1294 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (stating that the cancellation of registrations that are
void ab initio should not be precluded by equitable defenses).
162. Marshak, 240 F.3d at 192–93.
163. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 136 (D.D.C. 2003).
164. Id.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (2006).
166. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1069.
168. See id. § 1064; see also id. §§ 1052(d)–(e), 1125(c).
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These actions, which are not expressly permitted to be brought “at
any time,” would still be susceptible to equitable defenses such as
laches. In light of the interaction between the exceptions in each of
these statutory provisions, the district court’s application of laches to
the section 2(a) cancellation action in Harjo II clearly violated the ex-
press language of the Lanham Act with respect to disparaging trade-
marks. In plain language, laches simply does not apply to the
cancellation of disparaging trademarks.
3. Laches May Not Be Applied Contrary to the Public Interest
Additionally, laches should not be used to bar cancellation ac-
tions brought under section 2(a) where such suits are clearly in the
public interest. As the Third Circuit in Marshak noted, the kinds of
claims expressly permitted to be brought “at any time,” such as those
claiming disparagement under section 2(a), are unique in that they
involve marks that devalue the “integrity of the register.”169 As laches
is an equitable defense, courts have long held that laches will not ap-
ply to block a claim brought in the public’s interest.170 Furthermore,
the interest of the public must be the most important consideration
when balancing the equities underlying a laches allegation.171 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified how
the public interest should be considered in light of the standard two-
part test for the applicability of laches when it explained: “Laches is
not established by undue delay and prejudice. Those factors merely lay
the foundation for the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Where there
is evidence of other factors which would make it inequitable to recog-
nize the defense despite undue delay and prejudice, the defense may
be denied.”172
169. Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 2001).
170. See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Because laches is an equitable remedy, laches will not apply if the public has a strong
interest in having the suit proceed.”); TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1311, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“Where the proposed ground for cancellation is abandon-
ment, equitable defenses should be unavailable for the same reason they have been held
unavailable when the ground asserted is descriptiveness or fraud. It is in the public interest
to remove abandoned registrations from the register.”).
171. See Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 304 F.3d at 840 (“The public’s interest is of overriding
importance, and as such, should be considered apart from any presumption of laches.”);
Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he public good
is of paramount importance when considering the equitable defense of laches.”).
172. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Contr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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In light of this public interest component of a laches analysis, it is
logical that laches should not apply to many, if not all, cancellation
actions brought under section 2(a). Such cancellation actions do not
award a victorious petitioner any monetary damages or any other per-
sonal compensation for the time and energy invested in such ac-
tion.173 Instead, the result of a successful cancellation action is that a
disparaging trademark registration is canceled174 so that such dispar-
agement is no longer federally sanctioned. The federal trademark reg-
ister would then be closer to the fair and equitable library of
trademarks likely envisioned by Congress when section 2(a) was
enacted.
Additionally, because cancellation actions under section 2(a)
serve a public interest, “there is less likely to be a private party con-
stantly reviewing the Registry and promptly filing a petition than in
other trademark cases.”175 Thus, it is sensible that Congress carved
such actions out of the five-year limit and permitted them to be
brought “at any time.” The opposite seems counter-intuitive because
the USPTO has demonstrated that it is more likely to permit a poten-
tially disparaging trademark to register if, as in the case of BUDDA
BEACHWEAR, such mark references a minority population within the
United States about which the examining attorney and TTAB possess
little direct knowledge.176 Once the mark is allowed to register, it
would be up to that same small and likely historically disadvantaged
population to learn about the mark’s registration in a timely manner
and to understand the legal avenue available to cancel the registra-
tion. This is asking a lot of such third parties.
The court in Harjo II agreed that the public interest should be
considered when applying laches; however, the court felt that the pub-
lic interest vindicated in a section 2(a) action is less important than in
173. For this reason, cancellation actions under section 2(a) are more like a citizen suit
brought by a private individual on behalf of the government rather than an action between
two private citizens. As such, it could be argued that such third party petitioners should be
treated as if they stand in place of the government and would thus be immune from the
defense of laches. See, e.g., United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888) (“The principle
that the United States are not bound by any statute of limitations, nor barred by any laches
of their officers, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a sovereign Government to
enforce a public right, or to assert a public interest, is established past all controversy or
doubt.”).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006).
175. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009), petition for cert. filed, 2009 WL
2953014, *18 (U.S. Sept. 14, 2009) (No. 09-326).
176. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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other commercial trademark disputes.177 The court explained that
“the public interest is somewhat more narrowly defined in [the con-
text of section 2(a) cancellation actions] because it applies to a more
narrow segment of the general population . . . .”178 This reasoning,
while technically accurate in terms of the small Native American pop-
ulation in the United States, is misguided. Preventing the disparage-
ment of—and possibly the commercial discrimination and racism
against—even a small segment of the U.S. population is a much loftier
public interest than preventing consumer confusion over common-
place commercial goods.179 Congress clearly believed that preventing
the registration of disparaging trademarks was in the public interest
when section 2(a) was enacted. As such, the interest of the public
should be given substantial weight before applying laches to bar any
cancellation action brought on section 2(a) grounds.
IV. Recommendations
In light of the unfairly high burdens placed on third parties seek-
ing to cancel a disparaging trademark—in terms of both evidentiary
hurdles and the misplaced application of laches by the courts—
changes should be made to ensure that fewer disparaging trademarks
receive registration. The burden should be shifted away from the dis-
paraged third party and back onto the trademark applicant. After all,
it is the trademark applicant who directly benefits from the federal
registration and who is in the best position to fully inform the USPTO
of its reasons for selection of and intended use of the trademark in
question. This Article recommends the adoption of two primary pro-
cedural changes that would increase the evidentiary burden on the
trademark applicant, but which could lessen the likelihood that a
third party cancellation action would need to be brought by a dispar-
aged party. First, the USPTO must hold applicants to the evidentiary
burden of proof when an examining attorney has established a prima
facie case for disparagement. The USPTO needs only require the ap-
plicant to prove their case rather than “erring on the side of publica-
tion” and subsequently passing the disparagement dispute on to third
177. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 138 (D.D.C. 2003).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the public interest in preventing consumer confusion concerning
probiotic supplements did not prevent the application of laches to bar a false advertising
claim); Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
the public interest in preventing consumer confusion concerning the thickness of pasta
sauces did not prevent the application of laches to bar a false advertising claim).
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parties. Second, the Lanham Act should be amended to require a
trademark applicant to affirmatively disclose whether its proposed
trademark could be seen as disparaging. For marks like SEARS or
GOOGLE, which are clearly not disparaging, this would not require
much additional effort. However, for those applicants seeking to regis-
ter a mark that makes reference to a person, group, or entity, or for
applicants seeking to register a reappropriated mark, the proposed
statutory change would: (1) highlight the potential for disparagement
to the examining attorney so that the attorney’s own personal knowl-
edge of such disparaging terms becomes less important; and (2) per-
mit the applicant to speed up registration by providing evidence in
favor of the proposed trademark early on in the process.
A. Burden of Proof Should Be on the Applicant Rather Than a
Third Party
As mentioned above, the simplest change that can be made to
correct the current inconsistencies in the handling and treatment of
disparaging trademarks is to do away with the current policy of resolv-
ing doubts on the issue of disparagement in favor of applicants. When
an examining attorney refuses registration of a mark on the grounds
of disparagement, the USPTO’s own standards state that the burden is
rightly shifted to the applicant to rebut that determination.180 When
an examining attorney, the TTAB, or a court harbors doubts after an
applicant has provided evidence of their non-disparaging use of the
applied for mark, the reasonable conclusion is that an applicant sim-
ply has not met its burden of proof. Erring on the side of publishing
the mark for registration creates a disincentive whereby applicants
need not invest their full time and energy into proving that their mark
is not disparaging in the first place. Once this potentially disparaging
trademark is published and eventually registered, the failure of the
USPTO, TTAB, or court to hold the applicant responsible for meeting
this burden of proof becomes a nearly insurmountable hurdle im-
posed on a third party seeking to cancel the mark at a later date.
Requiring the trademark applicant to extinguish all doubts as to
whether a trademark is disparaging is still consistent with most of the
USPTO’s section 2(a) decisions. For example, in denying the second
trademark application for HEEB, the TTAB determined that the ap-
plicant could not show that the term “heeb” had been reappropriated
completely by the Jewish community: the applicant even admitted that
180. TMEP, supra note 28, § 1203.03(c).
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the older generation of Jewish individuals still found the term dispar-
aging.181 Thus, the applicant could not meet its burden of proving
that the mark was not disparaging to a substantial composite of Jewish
individuals. On the other hand, the applicant for DYKES ON BIKES
was eventually able to meet this evidentiary burden by showing that
dyke was no longer considered disparaging in the lesbian commu-
nity.182 Requiring that an applicant meet its burden of proof when an
examining attorney has made a prima facie case to the contrary is not
unduly burdensome and does not require anything other than that
the USPTO enforce the standards it has already set forth rather than
simply passing on the final decision of disparagement to third parties.
B. Affirmative Duty to Disclose
This Article asserts that a more drastic change may be necessary:
The creation of an affirmative duty on trademark applicants to dis-
close facts relevant to determine whether a new trademark application
includes any words, phrases, or imagery that may disparage any per-
sons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. Adding this affirmative
duty would require amendment of the Lanham Act to shift the initial
burden of recognizing potential disparagement from the USPTO and
individual examining attorneys to trademark applicants. Two possible
types of disclosure could be required: (1) a simple oath that, to the
applicant’s knowledge, the trademark is not disparaging; or (2) a
more burdensome requirement that a trademark applicant conduct a
pre-application investigation into whether the mark is disparaging and
disclose any relevant facts pertaining thereto.
Section 1 of the Lanham Act already requires an applicant for
registration of a trademark to execute an oath affirming that the ap-
plicant is the owner of the mark applied for and that “to the best of
verifier’s knowledge and belief, no other person has the right to use
such mark.”183 This section, or section 2, could easily be amended to
require that the applicant also submit an oath that “to the best of veri-
fier’s knowledge and belief” the trademark applied for, whether in
whole or in part, could not be seen as disparaging to any persons,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. The addition of this oath
would allow a third party to allege that the trademark registration was
obtained fraudulently in a future action to cancel this registration
under section 2(a).
181. In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1076 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
182. See DYKES ON BIKES, Registration No. 3,323,803, supra note 15.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(A), (D) (2006).
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However, proving fraud in the USPTO would require that the
third party prove that the applicant lied about their “knowledge or
belief.”184 With such a high burden of proof, one might ask what pur-
pose this change could possibly serve. Clearly, this would be another
evidentiary hurdle to a petitioner trying to cancel the registration
under section 2(a) as the petitioner would still need to prove that the
mark is disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced
group and would also need to prove that the applicant lied in stating
that it lacked knowledge of such disparagement. The sole benefit of
this oath by a section 2(a) petitioner is that fraud, if proven, would bar
the applicant from claiming the defense of laches.
It is well settled that “[a] party with unclean hands may not assert
laches.”185 A defendant asserting laches must have clean hands and
thus must have “acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the con-
troversy in issue.”186 Otherwise, such behavior “closes the doors of a
court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith rela-
tive to the matter in which he seeks relief.”187 Thus, fraudulently
claiming to lack knowledge that the trademark applied for could be
seen as disparaging would preclude the defense of laches that plagued
the Native Americans in the REDSKINS dispute. That case is a prime
example of how this oath could be beneficial to third party petitioners
since there is evidence that Native Americans met with and contacted
the owner of the Boston Redskins (now the Washington Redskins) to
protest the disparaging nature of the team’s name after he changed
184. See, e.g., In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Thus, we hold
that a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the Lanham Act only if the applicant or
registrant knowingly makes a false, material representation with the intent to deceive the
PTO.”); see also Susan M. Richey, The Second Kind of Sin: Making the Case for a Duty to Disclose
Facts Related to Genericism and Functionality in the Trademark Office, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
137 (2010) (advocating for an affirmative disclosure requirement in connection with the
USPTO’s prohibition on the registration of generic trademarks and functional trade
dress).
185. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 841 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that unclean hands did not bar the defense of laches in a false advertising
dispute because plaintiff failed to show that defendant acted with a fraudulent intent in
making the false advertising claims).
186. Alder v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th
Cir. 1985)) (holding that the relief requested by the plaintiffs was barred due to their
unclean hands because the plaintiffs intentionally attempted to aid and abet the defend-
ants’ scheme to steal from the government treasury).
187. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)
(dismissing plaintiff’s suit for patent infringement and breach of contract because of plain-
tiff’s unclean hands resulting from its knowledge of perjury and failure to act so as correct
such perjury).
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the name of the team from the Boston Braves.188 Such meetings oc-
curred prior to the submission of many of the REDSKINS trademark
applications to the USPTO, so it certainly would be possible to show
that the owner of those trademarks had knowledge of their potential
for disparagement.
However, this Article urges that a more drastic imposition on
trademark applicants would better resolve the problems that surround
section 2(a). Requiring applicants to conduct a pre-application inves-
tigation into whether the mark applied for could be seen as disparag-
ing and to disclose any relevant facts pertaining thereto would create
a more efficient and predictable system. As it currently stands, an ap-
plicant’s silence and an examining attorney’s lack of knowledge as to
a particular group’s beliefs could lead to the registration of a poten-
tially disparaging trademark.189 Then, this disparaging trademark
could only be canceled by a third party if that third party had knowl-
edge of this possibility for cancellation under section 2(a), the re-
sources to provide “substantial evidence” of disparagement, and the
time and energy to promptly devote to this cancellation action in spite
of the court’s automatic initial presumption that the trademark regis-
tration is valid.
Under this proposed change, the burden would be shifted to the
applicant to either state that a trademark is clearly not disparaging
(and has never been so) or to provide information to the USPTO con-
cerning possible disparaging uses along with evidence to explain how
the applicant’s proposed use is not disparaging in spite of such infor-
mation. Unlike the oath proposed above, the test for compliance with
this requirement would not need to evaluate whether the applicant
intended to defraud or deceive the USPTO. Rather, the TTAB or
court would be asked to determine if the applicant undertook a rea-
sonable investigation. This determination would look at whether the
applicant uncovered what a reasonable applicant in a similar position
could have been expected to discover and report. The USPTO could
clarify this reasonable expectation further by explaining that appli-
188. STAPLETON, supra note 72, at 2. After a 1972 meeting between Harold Gross, direc-
tor of the Indian Legal Information Development Service, and Edward Bennett Williams,
then-owner of the Washington Redskins, Williams refused to change the team’s name, but
agreed to change some of the more offensive elements of the team’s song, Hail to the
Redskins.
189. See, e.g., In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (where the TTAB
allowed the registration of BUDDHA BEACHWEAR because it claimed that it lacked suffi-
cient knowledge of Buddhist beliefs to determine whether the mark would be
disparaging).
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cants would be expected to look to the same sorts of basic sources that
an examining attorney must consult: “dictionary definitions, newspa-
per articles and magazine articles.”190 If an applicant failed to comply
with this duty of disclosure, the result would be a rejection of the
trademark application. Additionally, if a third party could show in a
cancellation action that the applicant failed to meet this reasonable
investigation requirement, the registration would be subject to cancel-
lation. However, in both instances the applicant would still possess any
common law rights that might exist in that trademark.
This is not an unreasonable burden on applicants given that dic-
tionaries, newspapers, and magazines are easily accessible resources,
and the disclosure of which would provide a modicum of background
information to the examining attorney while forcing applicants to
think more closely about the mark they are choosing to represent
their business. Realistically, this inquiry by a business owner into possi-
ble perceptions in the marketplace of a proposed mark is in the best
interest of any applicant. Any burden on applicants caused by the in-
vestigation costs, and possibly for the cost to retain counsel, are out-
weighed by the benefits that would be felt by the USPTO and by third
parties. The shifting of this initial burden to applicants promotes a
more efficient and possibly faster review of trademark applications by
the USPTO. Requiring this investigation might deter some applicants
from submitting clearly disparaging applications, or from submitting
applications that they realize are disparaging only after some initial
research. The typical disparaging trademark timeline consists of an
application that is denied maybe six months after being filed and is
then promptly abandoned by the applicant. Thus, pre-application re-
search could encourage applicants not to hastily file such controver-
sial applications that they would not be willing to defend as non-
disparaging in the future. Additionally, trademark examiners would
no longer be forced to perform this initial research, but could instead
review the information submitted by the applicant initially.
Though it is impossible to know for sure what would have hap-
pened if the proposed duty to disclose had been in place at the time
of the submission of the DYKES ON BIKES trademark application, it is
reasonable to assume that such prior disclosure could have sped up
the trademark application process by skipping the initial seven month
wait for the examining attorney to come back with dictionary evidence
of the disparaging use of the term “dykes,” followed by six months in
190. TMEP, supra note 28, § 1203.01.
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which the applicants were permitted to collect evidence to refute this
determination. If this change were implemented, the applicant for a
reappropriated trademark could come armed with its evidence of
reappropriation and non-disparaging use from the outset of the
application.
In the case of the REDSKINS marks, the initial preapplication
research may have highlighted for Pro-Football, Inc. the potentially
disparaging nature of the trademarks prior to the filing of its trade-
mark applications. Additionally, if Pro-Football, Inc. failed to disclose
the potential for disparagement to the USPTO at the time of filing
those applications, Native American petitioners may have been able to
seek to cancel the REDSKINS registrations by simply proving that Pro-
Football, Inc. failed to comply with its duty to conduct a reasonable,
preapplication investigation (especially in light of the fact that the pe-
titioners in the Harjo dispute were able to show that several dictiona-
ries listed the term “redskin” as disparaging).
Similarly, the applicant for the first HEEB trademark would have
had the duty to disclose to the USPTO the disparaging historical use
of the term “heeb.” This would have brought the question of dispar-
agement and reappropriation before the USPTO at the time of the
first application rather than the second. This may have resulted in the
denial of the registration of the first HEEB trademark, thereby
preventing the unusual position now faced by Heeb Media.
Conclusion
As long as section 2(a) exists as a prohibition on the registration
of disparaging trademarks, the procedures and policies employed by
the USPTO should work together to enforce that prohibition fully.
Most scholars addressing section 2(a) concerns have analyzed this pro-
hibition on federal trademark registration through a constitutional
lens. Thus, suggestions for improvement tend to favor unrestricted
speech and lessening the barriers to registration faced by appli-
cants.191 However, until section 2(a) is rendered unconstitutional,192
the real focus of concern should be on making the trademark registra-
191. See, e.g., Todd Anten, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the
Reappropriation of Slurs into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (2006)
(where Anten eloquently argues for a policy of pure deference in favor of registration of
reappropriated self-disparaging trademarks).
192. The court in In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) is often quoted for
its view that section 2(a) does not violate the First Amendment: “[I]t is clear that the PTO’s
refusal to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is pro-
scribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First
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tion process as fair and predictable as possible. Currently, the
USPTO’s policy of permitting the registration of marks where the
USPTO, TTAB, or the court remains unclear about whether a refer-
enced group would find the mark disparaging is disingenuous. A third
party should not be forced to prove disparagement when a trademark
applicant should have been held to that task in the first place.
The lackadaisical treatment of potentially disparaging trademarks
by the USPTO and the court system unreasonably hands off responsi-
bility for making a disparagement determination from the USPTO
and the individual applicant to an unrelated, disparaged third party.
In light of the huge evidentiary and practical hurdles faced by third
parties seeking to cancel disparaging trademarks, this abdication of
responsibility constitutes more than just a delay in undertaking this
disparagement analysis. The USPTO’s repeated failure to investigate
and properly uphold the disparagement prohibition at the applica-
tion level becomes de facto permission for the registration of certain
kinds of disparaging marks—those that disparage the smaller, under-
represented groups in American society about which many examining
attorneys simply lack personal knowledge.
Requiring that an applicant meet its burden of proving that a
mark is not disparaging is not unduly burdensome. The suggestions
made by this Article—that the USPTO require such burden of proof
be firmly placed on individual trademark applicants and that appli-
cants be required to affirmatively disclose whether their trademark
could be disparaging—are rather straightforward procedural changes
that would promote greater consistency in USPTO holdings and
would lessen the USPTO’s reliance on third parties to police the in-
tegrity of the trademark register.
In recalling the USPTO’s firm initial stance against the registra-
tion of DYKES ON BIKES, Brooke Oliver, the lead counsel for the
SFWMC, said, “We chuckled a little and said, ‘My, they’re a little out
of touch. We need to educate them a bit.’”193 The recommendations
made by this Article would require the very same: Trademark appli-
cants should research their own trademarks and educate the USPTO
“a bit” when their trademarks could potentially be disparaging.
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.” (citations
omitted).
193. Raab, supra note 7.
